



INSPECTIONS AND
VERIFICATION



POSSIBLE MILITARY
DIMENSIONS



SANCTIONS



DURATION



DISMANTLEMENT

1. INSPECTIONS AND VERIFICATION

Minimum Requirement: Inspectors must be permitted unimpeded access to suspect sites.

Proposed Deal: This deal is dangerous because it fails to achieve “anytime, anywhere” inspections and relinquishes deterrence provided by surprise inspections. The procedure for the IAEA to determine the need for an inspection could be lengthy, followed by a problematic process to resolve Iranian objections. Inspections could require a 24-day approval process, giving Iran time to remove evidence of violations.

Inspections Delayed 24 Days or More: There are no surprise inspections under this deal. It outlines a convoluted, multilateral process by which any IAEA request to investigate an undeclared site could take up to 24 days¹ or longer for approval. Iran could conceal or relocate most nuclear related activities during this period. Also, “the IAEA will provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification”² in advance of an inspection, thereby revealing intelligence that will allow Iran to adapt accordingly.

“Managed Access” is Insufficient: Rather than providing international inspectors unfettered access to undeclared sites as soon as they suspect a violation, the deal relies on so-called “managed access.” Assuming approval is even granted after the vetting ordeal, the IAEA is permitted a limited and supervised visit to any particular location, by which time the area would likely have been sanitized of any evidence of wrongdoing.³

Insufficient Additional Protocol Commitment: There is no requirement that Iran legally commit to the IAEA’s advanced inspections process, known as the Additional Protocol (AP), until late in the deal’s duration. Until then, any Iranian adherence to the AP would be “voluntary” per the terms of the deal. While even voluntary Iranian adherence to the AP would be an improvement, the AP fails to provide adequate investigative authority to the under-staffed and

under-resourced IAEA experts tasked with covering the enormous territory of Iran.⁴

No Americans Allowed: The agreement places arbitrary limits on the number and citizenship of IAEA inspectors, and allows Iran to veto the participation of any inspector. Iran should not be permitted to handpick the IAEA inspection and verification teams that the international community must rely on to ensure Iranian compliance and uncover deception.⁵

Any inspections regime “should include an agreement granting the IAEA necessary access to inspect all suspect sites, including military facilities.”

– Letter to President Obama signed by 391 House members on March 18, 2014

“Any inspection and verification regime must allow for short-notice access to suspect locations.”

– Letter to President Obama signed by 367 House members on March 20, 2015

¹ Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Annex 1, Section Q, Paragraph 78

² JCPOA, Annex 1, Section Q, Paragraph 75

³ JCPOA, Annex 1, Section Q, Paragraph 74

⁴ JCPOA, Annex V, Section D, Paragraph 22

⁵ JCPOA, Annex 1, Section N, Paragraph 67