



INSPECTIONS AND
VERIFICATION



POSSIBLE MILITARY
DIMENSIONS



SANCTIONS



DURATION



DISMANTLEMENT

5. DISMANTLEMENT

Minimum Requirement: Iran must dismantle its nuclear infrastructure such that it has no path to a nuclear weapon.

Proposed Deal: This deal is dangerous because it leaves almost all of Iran's extensive nuclear infrastructure intact. It alters Iran's plans for the Arak heavy water reactor, but requires no dismantlement of any centrifuges or any Iranian nuclear facility.

Maintenance of All Nuclear Facilities: This deal allows Iran to keep all of its nuclear facilities, including the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, the underground uranium enrichment site at Fordow, the heavy water reactor at Arak, and the gaseous-diffusion plant at Isfahan. Although some Iranian activities will be limited for 10-15 years, after that period, "the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT."¹ At that point, Iran will have an industrial-sized nuclear infrastructure capable of breaking out in a matter of days, without the risk of timely detection.

No Dismantlement of Centrifuges: This deal does not require Iran to destroy or fully decommission a single uranium enrichment centrifuge. Over half of Iran's currently operating centrifuges will continue to spin at Natanz.² The remainder, including more than 5,000 operating centrifuges and nearly 10,000 not yet functioning, will merely be disconnected and transferred to another hall at Natanz,³ where they could be quickly reinstalled to enrich uranium. Likewise, the more than 1,000 centrifuges at Fordow will remain intact—some idled and others spinning without uranium.⁴ Iran could recover its current enrichment capability in a matter of weeks should it banish IAEA inspectors. After eight years, Iran can begin to manufacture advanced centrifuges that enrich up to 15 times the speed of its current models.⁵

Temporary and Quickly Reversible Reduction of Uranium Stockpile: This deal requires Iran to significantly

reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU).⁶ However, Iran has domestic uranium mines, has mastered the uranium fuel fabrication process, and can easily reassemble its centrifuge arrays, enabling it to quickly generate more LEU if it violates the deal. Moreover, after 15 years, all restrictions expire, even if the IAEA never certifies that Iran's nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes.

Plutonium Path Merely Delayed: This deal requires Iran to reconfigure the Arak heavy water reactor so that it does not produce weapons-grade plutonium and to sell remaining heavy-water stocks abroad.⁷ However, after 15 years, all impediments are lifted and Iran can build additional heavy-water reactors and acquire the technology to reprocess its spent fuel into weapons-grade plutonium.

"We are hopeful a permanent diplomatic agreement will require dismantlement of Iran's nuclear weapons-related infrastructure...such that Iran will not be able to develop, build or acquire a nuclear weapon."

— Letter to President Obama signed by 391 House members on March 18, 2014

¹ Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Preamble and General Provisions, iv

² JCPOA, Section A, Paragraph 2

³ JCPOA, Annex 1, Section F, Paragraph 29

⁴ JCPOA, Section A, Paragraph 6

⁵ JCPOA, Section A, Paragraph 4

⁶ JCPOA, Section A, Paragraph 7

⁷ JCPOA, Section B, Paragraph 10 and Annex 1, Section B, Paragraph 2